New research on the Big Banks and the businesses left behind

Between 2019 and 2024, only 11.5% of all outstanding business loans in Canada went to small and medium-sized enterprises. Across the OECD, the average was 44%. And while SME lending has been growing in most peer economies, between 2016 and 2022, the share of Canadian lending going to SMEs actually shrank.

A new report from Social Capital Partners, Built to Exclude: Why Canada’s enterprises need a different kind of financing, argues that this is a visible signature of a financing system built around one institutional model. Six chartered banks hold more than 93% of Canadian banking assets and provide nearly 80% of SME lending outside Quebec.

Canada’s banking system is strong and stable. The big banks are good at what they do! The problem, when it comes to SME financing, is that what they can do is limited by how they’re structured.

What the system doesn’t finance

Liquidity rules, capital regulation and shareholder expectations shape every lending decision. The result is a system that struggles to provide whole categories of credit Canadian enterprises need: small loans, patient capital for productivity-improving investments, flexible terms for seasonal or project-based revenue, lending against intangibles like software and IP, mission-aligned capital for non-profits and community infrastructure, transition financing for owners exiting to employees or co-ops rather than private equity and relationship-based underwriting for borrowers whose viability doesn’t show up in standardized documentation.

The gap isn’t between viable enterprises and unviable ones. It’s between the kinds of lending that fit the dominant institutional model and the kinds that don’t. There’s a difference between an enterprise that’s inherently risky and one that simply doesn’t fit the operational model of a big, publicly traded, deposit-funded bank.

Looking outside the banks

Other countries have figured out how to overcome the structural limitations of big-bank financing by looking outside the banks.

Germany’s network of public savings banks, called the Sparkassen, serves community enterprises across the country. France’s Bpifrance is a large public bank with a statutory mandate for patient, long-term domestic financing aligned with industrial policy priorities. The U.S. and U.K. sustain robust ecosystems of community development financial institutions that channel capital to underserved communities and enterprises. Credit unions in countries like the U.S. and the U.K. have benefited from regulatory frameworks scaled to their size and risk.

Canada has made some attempts to cater to the specific needs of SMEs through the Business Development Bank of Canada, the Social Finance Fund and Community Futures,  but these programs lack the scale and permanence to fundamentally change the landscape. They’re patches on a system that needs structural change.

Canada ranks second-worst in the G7 as a place to be an entrepreneur, with 55 per cent of small-business owners saying they would not recommend starting a business here right now. We would argue that this is not a reflection of the limits of our entrepreneurs, but the limits of our lenders.

The productivity, resilience, inclusive growth and economic sovereignty objectives Canada is trying to achieve are not independent of its financing system. They are shaped by it. Canada can continue treating its financing monoculture as inevitable, or it can follow the lead of peer jurisdictions and intentionally build the institutional diversity required for a different outcome.

If we want a stronger economy that works for workers, communities and small businesses, we need a financial system diverse enough to serve them.


Built to Exclude: Why Canada’s enterprises need a different kind of financing | Report

Executive Summary

Canada’s enterprise financing system is dominated by big publicly traded, deposit-funded banks. They control more than 93% of banking assets and provide nearly 80% of small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) lending outside Quebec.

While these banks are internationally respected for their strength and stability, they face structural constraints that create predictable boundaries around what they can finance. Regulatory requirements demand liquidity buffers and higher capital against riskier loans. Quarterly earnings pressure drives short-term optimization and return-on-equity targets eliminate lower-margin opportunities.

Collectively, these structural features define the lending envelope within which these banks operate. They are not arbitrary choices or failures of bank management, but flow directly from the institutional design of big, publicly traded, deposit-funded banks. The result is a series of core eligibility criteria that systematically exclude viable enterprises across the economy:

  • Minimum deal size – Loans under $250,000 are considered unprofitable due to fixed transaction costs.
  • Standardized terms – Banks’ rigid credit models cannot accommodate flexible repayment schedules or atypical terms needed by firms with seasonal revenue or uneven cash flow.
  • Conventional borrower profile – Borrowers with thin credit files or limited experience cannot access financing, even when alternative risk indicators suggest viability.
  • Standard organizational structure – Non-profits, cooperatives, charities and Indigenous-owned enterprises frequently fall outside banks’ eligibility criteria.
  • Tangible collateral – Banks place a strong emphasis on tangible collateral when issuing loans, disadvantaging borrowers without collateral and asset-light firms.
  • Familiar geography and sectors – Rural and northern regions are perceived as higher risk and banks are reluctant to lend in sectors where they lack expertise.
  • Commercial return threshold – Businesses with thin margins or public-purpose missions struggle to access credit, even when financially sound.

The data on SME financing shows the scale of the problem in Canada. Between 2019-2024, only 11.5% of all outstanding business loans went to Canada’s SMEs, compared with an average of 44% across OECD countries.

At the core, this is a failure of institutional design. The point is not that these banks should lend more recklessly, but that Canada needs institutions designed to serve the enterprises that big, publicly traded, deposit-funded banks cannot structurally reach.

Efforts have been made. The Business Development Bank targets SMEs and marginalized entrepreneurs. The federal government funds the Community Futures network, backstops SME lending through the Canada Small Business Financing Program, and operates targeted initiatives like the Women Entrepreneurship Strategy, Black Entrepreneurship Program, and Social Finance Fund. But these initiatives, while valuable, lack the scale, institutional permanence, and systemic integration required to fundamentally alter Canada’s financing landscape.

Peer economies have built alternative financing institutions that operate alongside commercial banking as permanent, scaled infrastructure. Germany’s Sparkassen network of public savings banks provides local enterprise financing. The U.S. and U.K. sustain robust Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) ecosystems that channel capital to underserved communities and enterprises. The U.S. and U.K. have also built regulatory frameworks scaled to the size and risk of credit unions.

The productivity, resilience, inclusive growth and economic sovereignty objectives Canada is trying to achieve are not independent of its financing system. They are shaped by it. Failing to capitalize Canadian enterprises undermines the country’s capacity to have sovereign ownership of its own economy, which makes the economy less resilient, less democratic and less productive. Over time, it leaves Canada with an economy that is increasingly less dynamic, with more Canadians left outside a system that no longer works for them.

Canada can continue treating its financing monoculture as inevitable, or it can follow the lead of peer jurisdictions and intentionally build the institutional diversity required for a different outcome.

Introduction

A well-functioning financing system matches capital to productive uses across the economy. Because viable enterprises[1] vary widely, serving them requires lenders with a corresponding range of risk appetites, time horizons and return expectations. The question for any economy is whether its mix of financing institutions can adequately serve the enterprises that need capital.

In Canada, the enterprise financing system is dominated by a small number of big, publicly traded, deposit-funded banks.[2] While our financial system is internationally respected for its strength, stability and resiliency,[3] the business model of these banks, shaped by liquidity requirements, capital regulation, collateral preferences and shareholder expectations, creates predictable boundaries around what they can finance.

This paper argues that big-bank dominance of enterprise financing in Canada is an institutional design failure that has led to the undercapitalization of viable enterprises.

Other economies have taken a different path, building and sustaining alternative financing infrastructure that complements commercial banking at meaningful scale. Canada has some of these pieces but not at the scale or permanence required to alter the underlying structure of the system.

Not all excluded enterprises deserve financing and alternative institutions are not risk-free. But dominance by a single institutional type creates predictable gaps. Addressing this structural weakness in Canada’s financing system represents an opportunity to boost productivity, grow the economy, build community wealth, strengthen economic sovereignty and ensure that prosperity is more broadly shared. Failing to diverge from our current path risks further concentration of assets[4] and rising barriers to wealth-building and enterprise ownership. Over time, it would leave Canada with an economy that is increasingly less dynamic and less democratic, with more Canadians left on the outside of a system that no longer works for them.

The structural constraints of publicly traded, deposit-funded banking

Deposit-funded banks are important institutions. They turn short-term savings into long-term loans for businesses and homeowners, making it possible for the economy to invest in the future while keeping money accessible when depositors need it.

These banks operate largely on deposited funds they are obligated to return at any time. This means that if losses occur, it can spark a bank run where depositors attempt to pull their money out all at once, outstripping the bank’s immediate cash reserves.

In recognition of this vulnerability, Canadian banks are highly regulated to prevent both individual bank failures and the systemic collapse that would devastate households and businesses who depend on stable access to credit and payments. These regulations protect depositors and financial stability, but they also create predictable boundaries around the lending banks can provide.

Structural limitations that shape bank lending include:

  • Maturity mismatch and liquidity requirements – Banks fund long-term loans with short-term deposits that customers can withdraw anytime, creating a fundamental mismatch between the duration of their assets and liabilities. To manage the risk that too many depositors withdraw at once, banks must maintain liquidity buffers, which can limit the funds available for enterprise financing.
  • Capital regulation and collateral bias – Regulators require banks to hold more capital against loans deemed riskier, making those loans more costly to originate and hold on the balance sheet. Banks mitigate this capital cost by demanding collateral they can liquidate to recover losses, creating a structural preference for asset-backed lending. This preference excludes borrowers who do not have access to collateral.
  • Demand for hard information – Banks process loan applications at scale using standardized underwriting models that require verifiable, quantitative financial data (e.g. tax returns, audited statements, credit scores). This operational structure creates a systematic bias toward borrowers who can produce conventional financial documentation, regardless of their actual business viability.
  • Limited upside associated with debt – When a bank makes a loan, the best-case scenario is getting paid back with interest. No matter how successful the borrower becomes, the bank gets the same fixed return. But if the borrower defaults, the bank suffers losses (ranging from partial to full). This asymmetric payoff structure, with a capped upside, but full downside, creates a fundamental risk aversion where banks systematically avoid uncertainty. This is not to suggest that banks should act as equity investors, but to illustrate why their business model is inherently incompatible with particular types of ventures.

While these limitations apply to all regulated deposit-funded banks, big publicly traded banks face additional pressures that further restrict their lending:

  • Quarterly reporting – As a requirement of being publicly traded, banks must report financial performance quarterly. While these reporting mandates are essential for market transparency and regulatory oversight, they mean that banks face immediate stock price reactions to performance, creating pressure to optimize for short-term metrics. This reporting cadence discourages lending strategies that involve patient relationship-building, longer underwriting timelines, or investments in borrower development that might take years to pay off, even in circumstances where those approaches would generate superior risk-adjusted returns over a full credit cycle.
  • Profit expectations – Publicly traded banks must generate competitive returns on equity (ROE) to satisfy investor expectations and maintain their stock valuations, typically targeting ROE in the mid-to-high teens. This return hurdle creates a floor below which lending opportunities are rejected regardless of credit quality, meaning that viable businesses that expect lower returns, or borrowers who require more servicing relative to loan size, become systemically excluded.

Together, these structural features define the lending envelope within which banks operate. They are not arbitrary choices or failures of bank management, but flow directly from the institutional design of big, publicly traded, deposit-funded banks. For example, in the U.S., community banks (i.e. banks that are place-based and retail-focused) lend twice as much to small businesses as the big four American banks, despite holding less than a third of their total assets.[5] Understanding the implications of these limitations is essential to identifying which financing needs these banks can reliably serve and which require alternative institutional structures.

How big bank dominance translates to systemic exclusion

Canada’s financing ecosystem is unusually concentrated. Although there are more than 75 banks in Canada,[6] just six publicly traded chartered banks (BMO, Scotiabank, CIBC, National Bank of Canada, RBC and TD) account for more than 93% of Canadian banking assets.[7]

While entrepreneurs can access financing from a range of private credit providers, banks remain the dominant financer, providing nearly 70% of all debt financing to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) across Canada.[8] Excluding Quebec, where credit unions have a stronger foothold, they provide nearly 80% of SME lending.[9]

In a diverse financing ecosystem, different institutional types would serve different enterprise profiles. Some would be optimized for scale and efficiency, others for relationship lending or patient capital. But when one model dominates the market, its institutional blind spots become the entire system’s blind spots. The result is a series of core eligibility criteria that systematically exclude viable enterprises across the economy:

  • Minimum deal size – Loans under $250,000 are considered unappealing, given that transaction costs (origination, underwriting and monitoring) are fixed regardless of loan size. In Canada, recent reports indicate that loans to borrowers seeking under $1M have been declining, whereas authorization of loans over $5M has been increasing.[10]
  • Standardized terms – Banks’ rigid credit models rarely accommodate variability in financing terms (e.g. flexible repayment schedules, atypical amortization periods, etc.). This can be challenging for firms with seasonal revenues, uneven cash flow or long payback horizons.
  • Conventional borrower profile – Borrowers with thin credit files, limited experience or weak personal credit struggle to access financing, despite the existence of emerging risk assessment frameworks that consider alternative indicators (e.g. cash flow).
  • Standard organizational structure – Non-profit organizations, cooperatives, charities and enterprises owned by Indigenous communities frequently fall outside the explicit criteria or the perceived eligibility pathways of mainstream lenders.
  • Tangible collateral – Canadian banks place a strong emphasis on tangible collateral when issuing loans. OECD research indicates that 63.4% of Canadian SMEs are required to provide collateral to access debt financing, as compared to the OECD average of 51.5%.[11] This approach disadvantages borrowers without access to collateral as well as asset-light or service-based firms that rely on intellectual property, contracts, or social capital rather than physical assets.
  • Familiar geography and sectors – Lenders perceive rural and northern regions as higher risk due to smaller markets and lower asset liquidity. Statistics Canada research indicates that 70% of urban firms access financing via domestic chartered banks, versus only 45% of rural firms.[12] This is often simply a reflection of an information and knowledge gap, but it results in a reluctance to lend in sectors or regions where a bank does not have expertise.
  • Commercial return threshold – Businesses and organizations pursuing community, environmental, or low-margin goals struggle to access commercial credit, even when financially sound. Lenders see thin margins as insufficient cushion against default, unfamiliar business models as hard to underwrite, and public-purpose missions as potential conflicts with sufficient revenue generation. The absence of patient or mission-aligned capital forces many of these enterprises to operate below optimal scale or depend on grants.

It would be easy to read these factors as evidence that banks are simply pricing risk correctly. That is, that excluded enterprises are excluded because they’re genuinely riskier. But there’s a difference between an enterprise that’s inherently risky and one that simply doesn’t fit within the operational model of big, publicly traded, deposit-funded banks. Canada’s exclusionary financing environment reflects the limits of our dominant lenders, not the limits of our enterprises.

The enterprises left behind

On top of the exclusion factors referenced in the previous section, which are relevant to big, publicly traded, deposit-funded banks everywhere, the big Canadian banks also all operate under the same business model, diversified universal banking. Diversified universal banks combine retail banking, commercial lending, investment banking and trading operations, creating internal competition for capital allocation. SME lending must compete against higher-margin activities such as wealth management, capital markets operations and government-backed mortgage lending.

In Canada, the Big Six are generating a growing share of revenue from non-interest income,[13] while their lending portfolios are increasingly anchored by low-risk residential mortgages, including government-insured mortgages.[14] Together, these revenue streams reduce the banks’ economic incentive to deploy capital and underwriting capacity toward higher-risk, higher-cost enterprise lending.[15]

While not every business opportunity warrants funding, Canada’s big-bank dominated system consistently fails to capitalize viable enterprises, that is, businesses that do or could generate sufficient cash flow to service debt at reasonable terms. This exclusion spans the following categories:

Small and medium-sized businesses – Despite employing 64% of Canada’s workforce and accounting for 48% of GDP[16], Canadian SMEs capture only a small fraction of commercial credit. Between 2019-2024, only 11.3% of outstanding commercial lending in 2021 was directed to SMEs, significantly below the OECD median of 44%.[17]

Note: The OECD uses different metrics across jurisdictions to estimate SME lending share. For Canada, the figure is based on the proportion of  loans under $1M; for most other countries, it reflects loans to enterprises with 250 employees or fewer. While this limits direct comparability, the OECD considers these indicators to be broadly comparable. Regardless of methodological variation, the magnitude of Canada’s gap suggests a structural issue rather than a measurement artifact.

While lending to small businesses is increasing in other developed nations, Canada is heading in the opposite direction. Between 2016 and 2022, the share of loans going to Canadian SMEs actually shrank, even as it grew across the rest of the OECD.[18]

Non-profit and purpose-led businesses – Mission-driven enterprises face particular hurdles in accessing financing. Data from Statistics Canada indicate that cooperatives and social enterprises face lower approval rates for term-loan requests than the general SME population.[19] International research indicates that, as a result of perceived risk, banks are imposing increasing hurdles on non-profit organizations seeking financing.[20] As a result, many purpose-led ventures are unable to secure the flexible or patient capital they require and are forced to rely on grants or operate below optimal scale. While 40% of all SMEs report financing as a barrier, that figure jumps to over 75% among non-profit social enterprises.[21]

Community infrastructure – There is a persistent gap in accessible funding for community-level projects (e.g. local infrastructure, community facilities, affordable housing). For example, recent reporting indicates that more than 60% of Ontario hospitals have had to take on debt financing from banks at rates as high as prime plus 5.7%.[22] Banks often view these community infrastructure projects as too small, reputationally risky and/or unconventional. For example, despite insolvency rates for affordable housing of just 0.35%[23] (well below the all-industry average of 1.3%[24]), non-profit housing providers have resorted to issuing community bonds (debt raised from supportive local investors) to finance projects, explicitly bypassing traditional banks. This limited perspective compromises the potential for vital community infrastructure.

Marginalized business owners – In 2023, majority Black-owned businesses were 26% less likely to have loan requests fully approved than the average SME, while businesses owned by persons with disabilities were 31% less likely to receive full approval. [25] This aligns with patterns observed elsewhere – a recent study in the U.S. found Black and Latino founders were less than half as likely as white founders to be fully approved for bank credit, even when the firms were categorized as presenting a low credit risk.[26] A recent Statistics Canada study found that new immigrants were twice as likely to be “credit invisible” than Canadian-born families.[27] These disparities are partly driven by factors such as thinner credit histories, systemic bias, a lack of banking relationships and insufficient collateral linked to historical wealth gaps. Consequently, many marginalized entrepreneurs remain undercapitalized, despite having viable business plans, reproducing and accelerating cycles of systemic inequities.

Business modernization – Established SMEs looking to make capital investments often face financing hurdles. Banks’ conservative credit models favour lending for safe, short-term gains (like real estate purchases or proven expansion projects) over financing for productivity improvements that may have longer payback. For instance, a family manufacturing business aiming to invest in automation, or a retail business upgrading its IT systems, might not see an immediate revenue jump that fits banks’ risk-return criteria. The consequences of this underinvestment are visible at the national level. In 2024, Canadian businesses were investing only 41 cents in machinery and equipment for every dollar invested by their U.S. counterparts, a gap that has continued to widen.[28]

Transition and acquisition – A massive wave of business owner retirements is on the horizon, yet the financing system is ill-equipped to support the transition of these businesses to new owners. Three quarters of Canadian small business owners plan to exit their business within the next decade (mostly to retire), but only about 10% have a formal succession plan.[29] While banks are happy to lend[30] to PE firms acquiring small businesses, they are reluctant to lend for transitions to employee ownership trusts, co-ops, social enterprises, not-for-profits or community ownership, perceiving them as complex and risky.

Intangible economy – Firms in knowledge-based or intangible-asset sectors (tech startups, creative industries, service businesses relying on intellectual property or human capital) are often poorly served by Canada’s collateral-driven lending system. Banks strongly prefer loans secured by tangible assets like real estate or equipment, making it difficult for companies whose value resides in software, data, patents, contracts or expertise to qualify for credit. This financing gap has contributed to Canada’s chronic underinvestment in intangible assets. Since the mid-2000s, investment in intellectual property products has steadily declined relative to U.S. levels. By 2024, the average Canadian worker benefited from only 32 cents of new investment in IP products for every dollar invested for the average U.S. worker.[31] At the same time, Canadian innovators increasingly orient their intellectual property toward foreign markets. In 2022, Canadians filed 82% of their patent applications abroad (20,998 of 25,562) and 95% of their industrial design applications abroad (14,629 of 15,352).[32]

Microfinancing – Traditional banks consider very small loans unprofitable. Given that half of Canadian entrepreneurs start their business with less than $5,000[33], this leaves nascent entrepreneurs (e.g. a newcomer starting a home-based business, or a self-employed tradesperson) with few options. In 2024, 22% of white business owners and 33% of business owners of colour had to put business expenses on their personal credit cards.[34]

Across these categories, the pattern is consistent. Enterprises that require patient capital, relationship-based underwriting, flexible terms or mission-aligned financing struggle to access bank credit, regardless of viability. For example, a seasonal tourism business may be perfectly capable of repaying a loan structured with flexible terms, yet appear high-risk under a standardized underwriting model designed for level monthly payments. A non-profit housing provider with a 40-year track record and government-backed revenue may be financially sound, yet fall outside a bank’s explicit lending criteria. A service business built on contracts and expertise may generate reliable cash flow, yet fail a collateral screen designed for asset-heavy manufacturers. These businesses warrant financing, but big banks are not structured to provide it.

The compounding costs of exclusion

The systemic undercapitalization documented above generates cascading economic and social consequences for the Canadian economy. While isolating the precise contribution of financing constraints from other factors is methodologically difficult, the weight of evidence suggests that constrained capital access reduces innovation and firm creation, weakens local economies and community infrastructure, compounds inequality and concentrates economic power.

Lower innovation, productivity and competitiveness – Insufficient access to capital has been shown to hinder SMEs in innovating[35] and OECD research confirms that growth-oriented SMEs in Canada lag behind their peers when it comes to scaling up.[36] This is problematic because growing firms contribute disproportionately to new jobs, new products, competitive pressure and the introduction of new technologies.[37] Research also indicates that access to financial products and credit contributes to firm creation and viability,[38] which is important in that higher rates of firm creation are linked to stronger productivity growth.[39]

Declining entrepreneurship and community resilience – When businesses lack adequate access to enterprise financing, fewer survive economic shocks and entrepreneurship suffers.[40] Research indicates that, in Canada, restricted access to capital has contributed to rising fear of failure among new entrepreneurs[41] and recent data from the Canadian Federation of Independent Businesses identifies access to financing as one of the biggest barriers to entrepreneurship.[42] After Italy, Canada ranks as the second-worst place in the G7 to be an entrepreneur,[43] and fewer than half of Canadians believe it is easy to start a business.

These trends have serious implications for community resilience. Communities with higher proportions of SMEs have stronger per-capita growth,[44] faster employment growth,[45] lower poverty rates[46] and improved public health outcomes.[47] SMEs play an essential role in building resilient local economies capable of adapting to and recovering from shocks.[48] At a time of heightened economic uncertainty, the need for diverse, resilient local economies has never been greater.

Entrenching inequity and reduced economic mobility – When it is difficult to access capital, the barriers to entrepreneurship harden and opportunities for upward mobility diminish. Seventy per cent of SME owners rely on personal assets to finance their businesses, meaning that, for those without wealth, entrepreneurship and business ownership are effectively out of reach.[49] This dynamic reinforces persistent inequities. Only 16.8% of SMEs in Canada are women-owned, compared with 39% in the United States[50], only 1.3% of Black adults are entrepreneurs, compared to 2.3% for all Canadian adults,[51] and in 2022, although Indigenous Peoples represented 5% of Canada’s population, they accounted for only 1.7% of majority-owned private businesses. [52] As access to ownership and enterprise formation narrows, so do the pathways to intergenerational wealth-building, which deepens existing opportunity gaps.

Building institutional diversity in enterprise financing

Recent policy initiatives signal recognition that Canada’s enterprise financing system is leaving viable businesses behind. The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) is re-assessing risk weightings to encourage more bank lending, and the Competition Bureau has launched a market study on SME financing. Both are welcome steps, but are insufficient to address the scale of the issue. Prudential regulation, while an important tool, cannot override institutional design. And competition policy alone won’t generate institutional diversity.

Similarly, technology-driven improvements in small business lending are making it cheaper and faster for banks to serve SMEs. These are meaningful advances. But they operate within the existing institutional structure, applying the same risk models, collateral requirements and return thresholds more efficiently.

The point is not that banks should lend more recklessly, but that Canada needs institutions designed to serve the enterprises banks cannot structurally reach. Some of this infrastructure already exists. Notably, Indigenous leaders and organizations have built sophisticated and sustained financial infrastructure across Canada. The impact of this work offers important precedent for what might be possible if government were to do more to intentionally scale and support a parallel ecosystem of alternative financing institutions. That is, community development finance institutions, public banks, community banks, mission-driven credit unions and other non-bank intermediaries that can provide patient capital, flexible terms, relationship-based underwriting and mission-aligned financing.

The federal government has already made some investments in alternative financing infrastructure. The Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) targets SMEs and marginalized entrepreneurs through dedicated loan programs. However, BDC held just $46.9 billion in assets as of 2023,[53] a fraction of the Big Six banks’ combined balance sheet, and while more flexible than commercial banks, still excludes non-profits entirely and relies on creditworthiness assessment that leaves many viable enterprises unserved. The federal government also funds the Community Futures network of nearly 270 non-profit offices in rural and remote communities, backstops SME lending through the Canada Small Business Financing Program and operates targeted initiatives like the Women Entrepreneurship Strategy, Black Entrepreneurship Program and the Social Finance Fund. But these initiatives, while valuable, lack the scale, institutional permanence and systemic integration required to fundamentally alter Canada’s financing landscape.

Research indicates that institutional diversity is an important source of systemic stability and resilience.[54] Peer economies have acted on this finding and built alternative financing institutions that operate alongside commercial banking as permanent, scaled infrastructure. Germany’s Sparkassen network of public savings banks provides local enterprise financing. The U.S. and U.K. sustain robust Community Development Financing Institution, or CDFI, ecosystems that channel capital to underserved communities and enterprises. The U.S. and U.K., have also built regulatory frameworks scaled to the size and risk of credit unions. These countries actively work to cultivate durable institutions designed to fill gaps that big, deposit-funded, publicly traded banks cannot structurally serve.

The productivity, resilience, inclusive growth and economic sovereignty objectives Canada is trying to achieve are not independent of its financing system; they are shaped by it. Canada can continue treating its financing monoculture as inevitable, or it can follow the lead of peer jurisdictions and intentionally build the institutional diversity required for a different outcome. Upcoming research will look more closely at international financing infrastructure models and explore opportunities suited to the Canadian context.

 

[1] Note: For the purposes of this paper, enterprises encompass revenue-generating entities across for-profit, non-profit and cooperative legal structures.

[2] Note: Deposit-funded banks are a subset of banks distinguished by their primary funding source: deposits from households and businesses, which are typically insured by government.

[3] IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Financial System Stability Assessment with Canada

[4] The New Robber Barons

[5]  The Banks We Deserve

[6]  Canadian Bankers Association

[7]  The International Exposure of the Canadian Banking System

[8]  Survey on Financing and Growth of Small and Medium Enterprises

[9]  Survey on Financing and Growth of Small and Medium Enterprises

[10] Biannual Survey of Suppliers of Business Financing

[11] Financing SMES and Entrepreneurs: An OECD Scoreboard

[12] SME Profile: Rural enterprises in Canada

[13] Canadians paying billions of dollars in “excess” bank fees

[14] Canada’s banking regulator wants big banks to take ‘smart’ risks

[15] Remove barriers to financial sector productivity

[16] Key Small Business Statistics 2023

[17] Financing SMES and Entrepreneurs: An OECD Scoreboard

[18] Financing SMES and Entrepreneurs: An OECD Scoreboard

[19] Survey on Financing and Growth of Small and Medium Enterprises

[20] Bank De-Risking of Non-Profit Clients

[21] Survey on Financing and Growth of Small and Medium Enterprises

[22] Why Ontario hospitals are turning to banks loans to stay afloat

[23] CMHC 2024 Annual Report

[24] Annual Business Insolvency Rates by NAICS Economic Sectors

[25]  Survey on Financing and Growth of Small and Medium Enterprises

[26] Credit Survey Finds White-owned Small Businesses Were Twice as Likely to be Fully Approved for Financing as Black and Latino Owned Firms

[27] Immigrant credit visibility: Access to credit over time in Canada

[28] Canada’s Investment Crisis: Shrinking Capital Undermines Competitiveness and Wages

[29] Over $2 trillion in business are at stake as majority of small business plan to exit over the next decade

[30] An update on private equity M&A in Canada

[31] Canada’s Investment Crisis: Shrinking Capital Undermines Competitiveness and Wages

[32]  A look at Canada’s footprint in the world of IP

[33] 2021 Entrepreneur Census Summary

[34] Small Business Financing Report

[35] Financing constraints and SME growth: the suppression effect of cost-saving management innovations

[36] Scaling up is hard to do: Financing Canadian Small Firms

[37] Strengthening SMEs and Entrepreneurship for Productivity and Inclusive Growth

[38] The effects of financial inclusion and the business environment in spurring the creation of early-stage firms and supporting established firms

[39] Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth: The Proof is in the Productivity

[40] Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth: The Proof Is In The Productivity

[41] SME and Entrepreneurship Policy in Canada

[42] Canada’s Entrepreneurial Drought, Canadian Federation of Independent Businesses

[43] GEM 2024/2025 Global Report

[44] Why Care about Independent, Locally Owned Businesses

[45] Why Care about Independent, Locally Owned Businesses

[46] Why Care about Independent, Locally Owned Businesses

[47] Why Care about Independent, Locally Owned Businesses

[48] Building urban resilience through sustainability-oriented small-and-medium-sized enterprises

[49] Caary Capital Opens Its Doors to the 70% of SME Owners Putting Their Personal and Family Finances at Risk to Fund Their Business

[50] Women Entrepreneurship Strategy: Progress Report 2023

[51] The untapped potential of Black entrepreneurship in Canada

[52] Indigenous-owned business in Canada: confronting challenges, forecasting growth

[53] BDC 2024 Financial Report

[54] Measuring corporate diversity in financial services

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Author

Michelle Arnold, Policy Manager, Social Capital Partners


Are Canadian pension funds stepping up for Canada at this moment of threat? All signs point to maybe

By Matthew Mendelsohn | Part of our Special Series: Always Canada. Never 51

OMERS announced earlier this week that it will attempt to increase its investments in Canada by $10B over the next five years. The large Canadian pension planone of the so-called Maple 8has set a target of having 25 per cent of its investments in Canada, up from 18 per cent today. 

This is a good sign, but announcements and good intentions will not be enough. The incentive structure for fund managers, and the allocation of resources across asset classes and geographies, will need to change if pension funds are able to deliver on what their contributors and beneficiaries expect of them. 

My colleagues and I at Social Capital Partners have long argued that Canadian pension funds and other institutional investors, including charitable foundations, should invest more in Canada. We believe that Canadian capital should invest in businesses, communities and projects here at home that deliver long-term economic growth, community resilience and social impact. 

Our data show that the Maple 8 have invested less and less in Canada over the past twenty yearsWe have been concerned about this and have mada number of points that have become more urgent in light of the American threats to our economy and economic independence. 

Here’s how we think Canadian pension funds should step up for Canada at this moment of threat: 

 1. Pension funds cannot operate under a business-as-usual approach. There are real threats to the Canadian economy and Canadians. Institutional investors in Canada—and all those who hold and allocate wealth—have a moral responsibility to consider Canadian sovereignty and Canada’s long-term economic growth. Decision-makers should intentionally think about how they can contribute positively to Canadian firms and communities. That means investing more at home, while maintaining commitments to diversification and securing risk-adjusted market returns. 

2. Canadian institutional investors need to gradually pivot more of our capital away from the U.S. and continue to diversify globally. The U.S. today is a much riskier place than it was a decade ago. Canada is a much safer place and deepening our partnerships with democratic countries around the world through investment is a key pillar of Canada’s economic strategy. Those who invest Canadians’ savings cannot pine for a return to the good old days. It’s unlikely to happen, and those charged with assessing risk need to fundamentally change how they assess the realities of the U.S. market. 

3. Canada should stop investing in those who seek to do us harm. It does Canadians no good for funds to generate good returns by investing in companies that undermine Canada’s long-term economic growth, hollow out our productive economic capacity, rob young Canadians of opportunities and finance extractive business practices that consolidate wealth and destroy Canadian communities. At SCP, we have long argued that values other than narrow financial returns must be considered, and that point is more important than ever. It would be a shame if announcements like the one from OMERS resulted in no more than increased exposure to Canada’s most reliable bets, rather than acting as a catalyst to scale investments in affordable housing, community infrastructure and smaller Canadian firms. 

4. A strategic state partner is necessary to help build a stronger, more sovereign Canadian economy. Governments should act as concessionary and catalytic investors in venture funds, mid-cap funds, pooled affordable housing funds and new infrastructure of all kinds, including community and clean-energy infrastructure. The long-term economic, social and national security returns that flow from these investments are easily worth it. Governments can help institutional investors move towards investment strategies that strengthen Canadian sovereignty, resilience and community well-being.  

5. These changes will take real work. Institutional investors will have to change how they organize themselves and the incentive structures for their managers in this new world. They will need to pull back in some areas and build expertise around new Canadian asset classes. They will need to think with intentionality about sovereignty in their investment decisions. They will need to consider American political instability and belligerence in their risk assessments, just as they added climate risk to their traditional investment and governance considerations years ago. None of this will be easy and resources will need to be deployed internally and deliberately to support this pivot. 

All of this, taken together, means that the assumptions of the neoliberal, Washington-consensus era cannot continue to structure the thinking of those who manage our savings and invest on our behalf. We shouldn’t want capital investment if it weakens our sovereignty and strips Canada of productive assets. We shouldn’t invest in companies that deliver high returns but also deliver human misery and threats to our national security. 

The financial return on our investment must not be the only metric that matters. Contributors and beneficiaries want their savings invested in ways that create the places, communities and world that our investments make possible. It is possible to execute on one’s fiduciary duties in ways that align with Canadians’ values, strengthen our sovereignty and help improve Canada’s productivity and resilience. 

It is good to see this announcement from OMERS and I hope it represents a sea change in how they steward their investments and think about their responsibilities. There is a lot of work to do to change mindsets, skills and incentive structures. It appears that some of the leaders of our pension funds know they have to step up for Canada at this moment. But the geopolitical transformation we are living through will require a deep transformation in their investment strategies and practices as well. 


Watch the video: Should pension funds help build Canada's future? | TVO's The Rundown

TVO’s new nightly current affairs show lays out that the federal Liberals are pitching big, costly bets such as nuclear power, critical minerals and high-speed rail as central to Canada’s economic future, raising questions about who pays and whether pension funds should help finance projects tied to economic sovereignty. Matthew Mendelsohn and Keith Ambachtsheer join host Jeyan Jaganathan to examine the risks and rewards of tapping pension capital. Then, economist Kaylie Tiessen looks critically at the surge in “Buy Canadian” policies and whether they actually deliver on their economic promises.

Watch the recording

Keith Ambachtsheer
Co-Founder, KPA Advisory Services

Matthew Mendelsohn
CEO, Social Capital Partners


Tied Up: Unleashing Canada's non-profit housing potential

Introduction

Housing affordability is one of Canada’s most pressing economic and social challenges and non-profit housing providers have emerged as a critical partner delivering long-term, stable affordability across market cycles. They have demonstrated strong stewardship, low failure rates and a proven ability to deliver and operate affordable housing over the long term.[1]

Despite this, Canada’s non-profit housing sector remains structurally constrained. Well-intentioned accountability mechanisms, designed to protect public investment and ensure affordability, often have the unintended effect of limiting balance-sheet capacity, restricting access to financing and preventing asset leverage. Consequently, the non-market housing sector remains underdeveloped.[2]

In consultation with stakeholders and partners in the non-profit housing space, we have identified three technical issues that merit immediate attention: grants structured as forgivable loans, how leaseholds on public land are structured and how depreciation and capital reserve requirements are applied to non-profit providers. We propose practical ways to overcome these problems and reduce administrative burdens, while maintaining accountability.

We suggest that as a next step, municipal and provincial governments commit to resolving these and similar issues, and work with non-profit organizations to operationalize these (or other) solutions. Governments can move forward with a problem-solving mindset, committed to changing rules that prevent non-profits from leveraging the value of their assets to build more affordable housing. The Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) should also be brought to the table as their rules also sometimes act as an obstacle rather than an enabler of affordable housing.

1. Grants structured as forgivable loans

In some cases, governments provide grant funding to non-profit housing providers to purchase affordable housing stock, but structure that grant funding as a forgivable loan secured by a mortgage or charge on title. These loans are typically forgiven gradually (e.g., 1% per year over 99 years). The intent of this structure is to ensure long-term affordability by retaining a remedy in the event of non-compliance.

Issue:

While this structure protects affordability, it also immobilizes asset value. Although non-profits hold legal title, the encumbrance prevents them from leveraging the asset to reinvest in existing stock or finance new affordable housing developments. As a result, assets funded with public dollars are prevented from contributing fully to the public-policy objective they were intended to serve.

Potential solutions:

  • Provide grants outrightwith affordability requirements ensured in other ways, particularly covenants registered on title. Accountability can be preserved through legally binding affordability agreements registered on title. If registering agreements on title is deemed insufficient, governments could pursue additional mechanisms.

For example:

    • Registering a Right of First Refusal on title. This would ensure that if the property is sold, or affordability thresholds are not met, the government (or a designated non-profit) can make a first offer and/or buy on the same terms.
    • Using statutory title restrictions where appropriate. For example, a Land Titles Act s.118 restriction (as used in Toronto) can require municipal approval for sale or refinancing without blocking financing entirely.
    • Registering repayment obligations related to affordability breaches on title. For example, agreements could be developed wherein in the event of a grant recipient breaching affordability requirements, it must repay any public benefits it has received (e.g. property tax exemptions) and/or the difference between the affordability threshold and rents charged.
  • Pair forgivable loans with public guarantees. Where forgivable loans are retained, a guarantee in the amount of the value of the asset could be provided by government. This guarantee would enable lenders to extend financing to purchase other properties, allowing the asset to be fully utilized in pursuit of shared objectives. Given the stability of non-profit housing assets, this represents a low-risk use of public balance sheets.

2. Public leaseholds on municipal land

Municipalities frequently lease land to non-profit housing providers for long terms (often 49–99 years) at nominal cost for the lease, with the expectation of indefinite renewal. These arrangements facilitate the building of housing stock, while retaining public land ownership and ensuring long-term affordability.

Issue:

While effective as an accountability mechanism, leaseholds eliminate the ability to leverage land value, even where the non-profit bears the full cost of construction, maintenance and long-term stewardship.

This has three consequences:

  1. Reduced access to federal grants. CMHC development grants are calculated as a percentage of total project value. Leaseholds prevent non-profits from including land value, materially reducing available grant funding.
  2. Constrained access to financing. Despite their long-term and effectively perpetual control, non-profits cannot use the land to support borrowing, limiting expansion and acquisition opportunities.
  3. Challenges associated with tenant management and support. Given landlord-tenant legislation and other considerations, holding a lease provides considerably less latitude and control over management of tenants. Full scope of ownership provides non-profits with the latitude to support tenants, particularly those hard-to-house.

In effect, the value of public land is not being leveraged by either the municipality or the non-profit housing provider in support of expanding affordable housing options.

Potential solutions:

  • Conditional title transfers with reversion clauses and multi-party agreements. A defeasible fee (i.e. conditional ownership) could be used to transfer title of public land to a non-profit housing provider while making ownership conditional on continued public-purpose use. This would allow the asset to live on the non-profit balance sheet, which would unlock CMHC grants and potentially increase access to private financing. Making this solution work would require sophisticated multi-party agreements between governments, housing providers and financing institutions that outline risk mitigation around the reversion potentiality.
  • Accounting treatment carve-outs under the Housing Services Act. Provincial amendments to the Housing Services Actcould allow non-profits to recognize the value of leased public land on their balance sheets where long-term control is effectively equivalent to ownership. This would enable access to CMHC grant funding and may have some impact on access to private financing.
  • Adjustments to CMHC process of assessing total project value. CMHC could allow land value to be recognized for grant purposes even under leasehold arrangements. While this would not have any impact on access to private financing, it could unlock CMHC grant funding.

3. Depreciation and capital reserve requirements

Under the Housing Services Act, non-profit housing providers must record depreciation based on mortgage principal repayment (versus wear and tear) and they must contribute annually to capital reserve funds for major repairs, recording these contributions as operating expenses.

Issue:

These two requirements address the same underlying reality, accounting for asset aging, but do so separately. The result is double recognition of obsolescence, placing unnecessary pressure on operating statements and reducing financial flexibility.

Potential solutions:

  • Amend the Housing Services Act to avoid double counting. Capital reserve contributions could be designated as the primary mechanism for recognizing asset obsolescence. Depreciation would then be recorded only to the extent that reserve contributions fall below an approved benchmark.

Conclusion

With renewed national attention on housing and the launch of Build Canada Homes, a new federal agency dedicated to building affordable housing at scale, the unique challenges facing non-profit providers can no longer be treated as secondary concerns. Build Canada Homes has committed to “utilizing flexible financing tools and focusing on large, multi-year portfolio deals with trusted non-market developers,”[3] but that ambition is only achievable if all levels of government take the steps necessary to clear administrative hurdles that constrain the nonprofit sector. Non-profits can only come to the table with portfolio-scale deals if the policy, legislative and accounting environment does not constrain their ability to leverage their assets for more ambitious affordable housing projects.

By optimizing grant structures, rethinking leasehold arrangements and aligning accounting rules with asset stewardship realities, we believe governments can unlock significantly greater impact from existing public investments, without compromising affordability or accountability.

The ideas presented here are a starting point. We know there are many additional levers for enhancing the impact and scale of non-profit housing providers and have flagged several areas warranting further research in the Appendix.

Non-profit housing providers are essential to achieving durable housing affordability in Canada. Although they provide a relatively small share of Canada’s overall housing stock, this is, in part, because current accountability and financing structures constrain their ability to leverage their existing assets to scale and deploy capital effectively. Non-profits could do more to build resilient, diverse and affordable housing if the enabling conditions outlined in this paper were achieved.

Acknowledgements

This paper was informed by the expertise and experience of a number of stakeholders. We’re incredibly grateful for their feedback, guidance and input.

Reviewers
Joshua Barndt (Parkdale Neighbourhood Community Land Trust), Sean Campbell (Union Co-op), George Claydon (Canadian Urban Institute), Michael Fenn (Good Shepherd Non-Profit Homes Inc.), Andrea Nemtin (Social Innovation Canada), Nick van der Velde (Indwell), Aleeya Velji (Enfin Impact), Peter Wallace and Dr. Carolyn Whitzman (School of Cities, University of Toronto). 

Appendix A: Potential areas for future research

In our work in putting together this short paper, a number of high potential avenues for further research and discussion emerged. We wanted to document a few of them here in the hope that other organizations will pursue them further.

  • Opportunities for other non-commercial actors, such as hospitals and faith-based organizations, to partner with non-profit housing providers through leasing and/or shared ownership opportunities.
  • An analysis of existing loan guarantee programs related to housing and community infrastructure that highlights what works and could be replicated.
  • An analysis of housing assets in National Parks and whether that model could be applied more broadly to public lands.
  • Recommendations for how a First Right of Refusal might be practically operationalized, depending on the partners involved (e.g. level of government, non-profit partners, etc.).
  • An assessment of the potential impact that MURBs and Limited Dividend Housing Corporations could have in the current context.
  • An analysis of how and when land transfer taxes are appropriate to support affordable housing.
  • How the Public Sector Accounting Board and other non-profit accounting standards should account for the capitalization and amortization of tangible capital assets in a manner that accurately reflects the strength of balance sheet positions and long-term fiscal sustainability.

References

[1] Evidence from around the world indicates that housing stock, including social and affordable housing, is a stable asset class. In Canada, the real estate and rental and leasing sector posts an insolvency rate of roughly 0.2 per 1,000 firms, far below the all-industry average of ~1.3.  The best approximation of the insolvency rates for affordable housing comes from CMHC’s data, which shows CMHC-insured multi-unit mortgages (which covers a large share of Canada’s non-market and affordable housing stock) had just 0.35% arrears in 2024. The U.S. offers a long, independent benchmark. Properties financed with the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)—a mix of nonprofit and for-profit owners in a heavily regulated program—show a cumulative foreclosure rate of ~0.5%, with no new foreclosures reported in 2021–2022 in the latest comprehensive review. The underlying reason is that demand is deep and sticky. LIHTC housing stock had a 98.6% occupancy in 2021, meaning only 1.4% were vacant at any given time, mostly during routine turnover. Tenants stay longer; cash flow is predictable. Australia’s regulated sector lands in the same place: community housing providers run at ~99% occupancy with just 1.83% of rent outstanding.

[2] https://nhc-cnl.ca/publications/post/scaling-up-the-non-market-housing-sector-

[3] https://housing-infrastructure.canada.ca/bch-mc/framework-agreement-entente-cadre-eng.html

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Authors

Michelle Arnold, Policy Manager, Social Capital Partners

Savraj Syan, Fellow, Social Capital Partners


Unlocking non-profit assets: The low-cost fixes Canada's housing sector desperately needs

Currently, Canada’s non-market housing sector makes up 3.5% of the housing system, which is only half the size of those of our OECD peers.

Growing the non-market sector is now a national priority and building the capacity of non-profits to deliver more of it is one of the most important levers available.

Unfortunately, at the very moment governments are counting on non-profit housing providers to deliver more affordable housing, a set of overlooked technical barriers is preventing those same providers from leveraging their own assets—which is key to increasing their borrowing power—to do exactly that.

The barriers are not the result of bad faith.

Rather, they are the unintended consequence of well-meaning accountability measures designed to protect public investment. But what may have made good sense as standard grant-making practice has calcified into a set of legacy constraints that actively work against the goals they were meant to serve. In a housing crisis, that kind of misaligned risk aversion has a real public cost.

Although we know this is not an exhaustive list, we want to highlight a few specific barriers that, according to our consultations in the sector, are constraining non-profit housing providers:

  • Grants structured as forgivable loans — which encumber title and lock up asset value that nonprofits could otherwise use to finance new housing
  • Long-term leaseholds on public land — which prevent nonprofits from recognizing land value on their balance sheets or using it to access financing and federal grants
  • How depreciation and capital reserves are treated — current rules require non-profits to account for asset aging twice, placing unnecessary pressure on operating budgets

While these may seem minor, or even obscure, individually and together they create meaningful restrictions on non-profits’ ability to leverage their assets. When a non-profit is prevented, through these intricacies, from using their land, property or assets to secure potential loans, this prevents them from being able to purchase or finance land or housing that they could otherwise not afford.

We’ve outlined potential solutions to address these unintended consequences in a short paper. We believe they are relatively simple, low-cost ways to enable more non-profits to construct and expand affordable housing, while still protecting the public interest. They include:

  • Converting forgivable loans to outright grants, with affordability protected through covenants registered on title
  • Facilitating public guarantees that allow nonprofits to leverage the value of land they operate on
  • Amending the Housing Services Act to enable alternative accounting practices that strengthen nonprofit balance sheets
  • Working with CMHC to allow the value of leased land to be recognized as part of total project value

We know these are not the only barriers or the only solutions to Canada’s complex and evolving affordable housing crunch.

Based on our consultations with experts and frontline providers in the field, we urge municipal, provincial, housing and finance officials, alongside elected representatives, to consider these suggestions. We also encourage them to canvass for additional challenges and work together to standardize solutions across jurisdictions.

There are so many barriers to fixing the housing crisis. But in this case, the assets are there. The will is there. The fixes are within reach.


Toronto is piloting a city-owned grocery store. Could it help fight high food prices?

By Matthew Mendelsohn | Part of our Special Series: The Ownership Solution

Food is too expensive in Canada. There are many reasons, but one is certainly the oligopolistic control of our food markets—in retail groceries, but elsewhere in the food supply chain as well.

Governments at all levels are aware of this and have indeed tried various approaches to deal with the cost of essentials.

The Canada Grocery Code, a set of written but voluntary rules designed to bring greater fairness, transparency and predictability to the Canadian grocery supply chain, may have some impact. Investments in the security of the supply chain may help Canada withstand shocks. And the National School Food Program, which has a target of providing school meals to 400,000 more kids per year, should deliver real results.

A variety of general income support measures have been introduced or increased to help support modest income Canadians deal with rising costs, including for food.

The most important initiative is reform to competition law and create a more empowered Competition Bureau.

We will have to wait to say what the real-world impacts of all these efforts are.

But the federal government hasn’t confronted some of the structural forces within their control that lead to higher food prices. A big one is excess profit taking by our grocery giants and their use of their market power to overcharge Canadians for essentials.

The evidence is very clear that we experienced “sellers’ inflation” during COVID—large grocery chains and others taking advantage of the disruption and confusion in the market to raise prices out of proportion with their increased costs. This same kind of inflation-of-choice is likely to take place again during the current energy crisis.

Canada’s grocery chains make profits way out of line with their global peers. The international evidence for this is clear.

And Canadians feel it—the data are clear that, since COVID, food inflation has spiked.

So, I’m really excited about the City of Toronto moving forward to pilot public grocery stores and investigate algorithmic pricing. As City of Toronto Mayor Olivia Chow said on March 27th, “this could go a long way to making life more affordable withy more competition to drive down costs, helping households save more and eat better.”

A case could be made to move more aggressively, but a pilot is a good way to gather information and experiment with small changes first and then adjust and scale as we learn what works.

How will they be designed? Can they be delivered effectively? Would it be better if it was city run or run by some other community ownership structure? How will they integrate with local supply chains? Will they focus on a basket of core staples? I’m not sure.

But there are things I am sure about. I know that what we have been doing is not working. Too many people in Canada—a wealthy, food-producing country—go hungry. It’s simply not acceptable.

I know that the neoliberal economic solutions—let capital set the rules, reduce the role of government in shaping markets and allow big players to consolidate—have delivered us to where we are: many working people in Canada can’t afford an apartment or food.

I also know that publicly owned stores won’t use a crisis and market confusion to raise prices out of line with their increase in input costs in order to deliver high returns to investors.

And I know that governments should try different things to solve public problems. We really are in a moment of geopolitical and economic rupture. The solutions we’ve tried for the past 50 years are unlikely to be the ones that are best moving forward—some of them actually have exacerbated the inequality and affordability crises we’re experiencing.

There is lots of evidence that more public and community ownership of the economy is one part of the solution to the crises we face. We should be open to trying more solutions that don’t come from the neoliberal handbook.


Two women walk in tech office looking at iPad

Why Canada should back employee ownership trusts for the long term | TheFutureEconomy.ca

By Jon Shell | Part of our Special Series: The Ownership Solution | This piece first appeared in TheFutureEconomy.ca

Canada is getting used to standing more proudly on its own two feet since our longest-standing ally launched an economic war against us. At this trying moment, Canadians are asking how we protect our sovereignty, make life more affordable for workers and families and build a stronger, more resilient economy for the long term.

One practical answer is already on the books: the Employee Ownership Trust.

Right now is the right moment for Canada to rethink who owns and benefits from our country’s most productive assets. Because if we don’t, we will continue to see viable Canadian companies sold to foreign buyers looking to control our resources—like a conveyor belt moving local success stories out of Canadian hands.

Two women walk in tech office looking at iPad

Employee Ownership Trusts, or EOTs, offer a different business succession option that keeps companies rooted in the communities in which they were built. Established in 2024, the EOT allows business owners to sell to a trust that holds shares on behalf of employees. Owners receive full market value paid out of future profits, while workers become employee-owners, without having to invest their own savings.

This model protects Canadian sovereignty by anchoring firms at home. Every EOT sale keeps ownership rooted in Canada, with that firm’s long-term success becoming directly tied to the well-being of its workforce and the community where it operates. It makes life more affordable for workers by helping them build real wealth—in some cases, the first meaningful ownership stake they’ve ever had. And it strengthens the broader economy: research shows employee-owned firms deliver an 8-12% productivity boost, are more likely to survive economic downturns and less likely to lay off workers during recessions.

These outcomes have been proven over decades in the United States and the United Kingdom. Both countries encourage employee ownership with all-party political support and substantial government incentives that spur on their success.

The US now has more than 6,000 employee-owned companies generating over $2 billion in worker wealth, while the UK’s EOT has created new income streams for more than 335,000 workers across nearly 2,500 firms. While it will take some time for Canada to get to that level of adoption, economist Brett House has projected that Canada could eventually see more than 100 new EOTs per year, if the right policy conditions are in place.

Read the full op-ed

How Employee Ownership Trusts keep wealth in Canada | Canadian Business

By Jon Shell | Part of our Special Series: The Ownership Solution | This post first appeared in Canadian Business

Canada is entering one of the largest waves of business succession in its history, with thousands of founders preparing to retire. A 2023 report from the Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB) report found that about three-quarters of Canadian small and medium-sized business owners, controlling more than $2 trillion in business assets, plan to leave their companies within the next decade. The question isn’t whether these companies will be sold, but who will own them and where the benefits will flow.

For decades, many retiring business owners sold their companies to private equity or foreign buyers. Today, however, the shifting political and economic climate in the United States is prompting some Canadian owners to rethink the implications of such sales. In a period of volatility and rising economic nationalism at home, ownership is critical in shaping company decisions, directing capital and determining whose interests drive a business’s future.

As chair of Social Capital Partners (SCP), a non-profit organization focused on broadening access to wealth and ownership, I have advocated for solutions that keep ownership in Canadian hands while benefiting employees. One of the most practical tools to achieve this is Employee Ownership Trusts (EOTs), which lets business owners sell a majority stake to a trust holding shares on behalf of employees, without requiring them to invest their own money. The trust typically finances the purchase through a mix of bank and owner loans, repaid over time from the company’s future profits. As the business grows, employees share in the financial success, gaining ownership without taking on personal risk.

EOTs were established in the United Kingdom in 2014, providing business owners a practical way to transfer ownership to employees while protecting jobs, company culture and local roots. The model was designed to support business succession and keep companies within their communities. In Canada, federal legislation for EOTs arrived in June 2024, offering a similar solution to succession challenges and a path to strengthen communities through local employment.

Early signs show they are already having a positive impact. Grantbook, a Toronto-based strategic technology consultancy, became the first Canadian company to transition to an EOT last year. Another example is Taproot, a social services organization with 750 employees serving individuals, families and youth across British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario. Its leadership chose to transfer ownership to employees rather than sell to an outside buyer, preserving the organization’s mission, keeping it under Canadian control, and giving frontline workers a stake in its long-term success. One employee described it as the first time she had truly owned anything in Canada–an immigrant who built her career here, she suddenly held a stake in the company she helped grow. This isn’t purely symbolic–it’s real wealth creation.

Research shows that EOTs are also a sound business strategy. Research by Harvard Business School shows employee-owned firms often see higher productivity, stronger retention and greater resilience during downturns. When employees have a vested interest in the company’s success, they are more engaged and productive. These firms also default less on loans and lay off fewer workers during recessions. EOTs can work for many industries, but they are best suited to mature, cash-flowing sectors, such as professional services, manufacturing, wholesale and construction, where stable profits make it easier for the trust to finance the purchase and repay the seller over time.

In June 2024, the federal government took a step forward by introducing a temporary $10 million capital gains exemption for qualifying sales to EOTs, available through 2026. But for the policy to drive growth, the market needs certainty. Its imminent expiry, after being in effect for less than three years, is preventing the expansion seen elsewhere. The government must act quickly to make the incentive permanent, providing a clear path for employee ownership to contribute to a stronger, more productive economy.

Experience abroad shows that stable, predictable incentives are key to growing employee ownership over the long term.

In the United Kingdom, significant tax incentives have helped employee ownership grow steadily since 2014, with around 2,470 companies now using EOTs. In the U.S., long-standing government support for employee ownership has led to more than 6,400 companies with Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), where employees gradually acquire shares, often funded by profits or loans. These examples show how sustained policy can grow employee ownership.

EOTs may not be suitable for every company. Transitions typically take a year or more and require careful financial planning, including financing the trust. Policy uncertainty compounds the challenge–many owners hesitate to begin a transition with the capital gains exemption set to expire at year’s end. Alongside some of Canada’s top business leaders and CEOs, we’re actively advocating for Ottawa to create a solid runway for EOTs to take off in Canada by making this vital tax incentive permanent.

As uncertainty in the U.S. continues to shape capital markets and political debate, Canadian business owners are increasingly aware of the consequences of foreign ownership. When companies are sold abroad, key decisions about investment, hiring and growth are often made elsewhere, weakening local control and community ties. Employee ownership provides a distinctly Canadian alternative.

The coming wave of succession will shape Canada’s economy for generations. Employee ownership safeguards economic sovereignty, while boosting growth and productivity and giving employees struggling with affordability a new source of income. As owners seek alternatives to selling abroad, the EOT provides a practical answer. Instead of letting support lapse, now is the time for the government to double down on employee ownership.


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